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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2567 
_____________ 
 
EDWIN MUTH, 
                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LSI CORPORATION 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                       
District Court  No. 5-09-cv-01689 
District Judge: The Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 24, 2011 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 4, 2011 ) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
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 On October 24, 2007, defendant-appellee LSI Corporation discharged 
plaintiff-appellant Edwin Muth after nearly thirty years of employment. This 
termination was the product of LSI’s decision to sell the division of its business in 
which Muth worked (the Mobile Products Group, or MPG) to Infineon 
Technologies North America.  All MPG employees became Infineon employees 
the day after the sale closed, so Muth was never left without a job.  He did, 
however, miss out on the full benefits of his ERISA retirement plan, for which he 
would have become eligible had he remained an LSI employee for one month 
more.  Muth attempted to gain concessions from LSI, proposing a plan under 
which he would have stayed on its payroll for a few weeks in order to reach his 
milestone 49th birthday.  His employer was unmoved.  The sale went through and 
Muth lost his job for a few hours—and, with it, his yet-to-be realized pension 
benefits.   
 Muth sued, alleging that LSI had violated ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, 
by intentionally preventing him from obtaining retirement benefits.  The District 
Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and granted summary judgment for 
LSI on the basis that Muth had not proffered evidence showing that LSI had 
terminated his employment for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of his 
entitlement to ERISA benefits.  The court further opined that even if Muth had 
proved his prima facie case, LSI had come forward with a legitimate, non-
 3 
 
interfering purpose for its action (viz., the transfer of MPG’s employees to 
Infineon was essential to the sale agreement), and Muth had not shown that this 
purpose was a pretext invented to cover up an illicit employment decision.   
We have jurisdiction to review this final judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 
we consider de novo the question whether summary judgment is appropriate.  
Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000).  That question is 
to be answered in the affirmative if ―there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a), including where a party who bears the burden of proof on an essential 
element of his case fails to make a showing sufficient to establish that element’s 
existence.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).  Applying this 
standard to the record before us, we must conclude that the District Court was 
correct.  We will therefore affirm its judgment. 
The prima facie case for Muth’s § 510 claim requires that he produce 
evidence showing three elements: ―(1) the employer committed prohibited conduct 
(2) that was taken for the purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment of any right 
to which the employee may become entitled.‖  Jakimas v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 
Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The District Court rightly determined that although elements (1) and (3) 
have been fulfilled, there is no evidence that all or part of the purpose of LSI’s 
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discharge of Muth, or the timing thereof, was interference with his receipt of 
ERISA benefits. 
The District Court furthermore correctly held that even if there had been a 
prima facie showing of illegal purpose, there was ample undisputed evidence that 
Muth ―was terminated because he was part of the business group transitioning to 
Infineon, and not for any other reason.‖  Muth Br. 24.  Muth himself goes so far as 
to call that conclusion ―obvious.‖  Id.  So it was up to Muth to come up with 
evidence that this purpose was pretext, but there is none of that either.  (The ―not 
for any other reason‖ clause of the above quotation from Muth’s brief would 
appear to foreclose any argument to the contrary.)   
For all the record shows, the only reason LSI discharged Muth was the 
consummation of its deal with Infineon.  LSI might have been able to honor 
Muth’s request to hold off on releasing him until he had met his age requirement, 
and its failure to do so reflects an unfortunate degree of corporate callousness 
towards a loyal employee of thirty years.  But ERISA does not outlaw cold-
heartedness except insofar as it prohibits employment actions motivated by intent 
to discriminate or interfere with the collection of plan benefits, and there is no 
evidence of such motivation here.  We will therefore affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
